John Browne is due to deliver
his recommendations on
revising the system of undergraduate finance in October. But the starting point
for any consideration of what is to come can not be the various policy options
he is analysing. It has to be the question of what legislation can be pushed
through the House of Commons.
Undergraduate finance is a highly charged topic. Any reform
of this middle-class welfare is electorally potent and can be likened to
driving a train freighted with political dynamite through hostile media
territory. It would be a massive undertaking for any prime minister, whatever
their majority. But for David Cameron, with the Lib Dems threatening to
abstain, it’s specially explosive.
Government legislation on this is not guaranteed a majority
and Cameron could end up a loser. The need to prevent that is why we all need
to start thinking like a whip. Once you do, the current fog of confusion over
things like the idea of a graduate tax dissolves.
The arithmetic
The arithmetic in the Commons is this:
Conservatives - 306 (after allowing for the Speaker)
Liberal Democrats - 57
Labour - 258
Others - 24 (excluding Sinn Fein absentees).
If the Lib Dems vote with the Conservatives, then their vote
seems overwhelming - 363 vs 282, a majority of 81. Whatever the substance,
whatever the rebellion, Cameron can’t fail to get a vote through if Clegg is
leading his party past the Aye tellers.
However, the coalition agreement gives the Lib Dems the
right to abstain in certain circumstances. The text of the agreement states: “If the response of the Government to Lord Browne’s report
is one that Liberal Democrats cannot accept, then arrangements will be made to
enable Liberal Democrat MPs to abstain in any vote.”
This seems a loosely-worded opt-out that Clegg can play at
will, potentially covering several votes. If the Lib Dems opt out, then the
arithmetic gets much tighter - the Conservative 306 vs a maximum of 282 others,
a majority of 24. This means just 12 Conservative rebels could potentially
defeat a vote in the Commons, provided all the opposition parties oppose it.
This brings us back to the factional dynamics within the
Conservative party that bedevilled John Major. He had a dozen right-wing
“bastards” who were prepared to do immense damage to the party as a whole in
order to try and push the party rightwards. That right wing is still there in
the Conservative party and is, by all accounts, spoiling for a fight. A vote on
fees with Lib Dem abstentions is one of the few chances it is going to get to
give Cameron a bloody nose.
If the Lib Dems abstain, then the potential to defeat
Cameron will likely be too tempting for Labour to refuse, whatever the
substance on offer. So passage of any vote in the Commons will depend primarily
on how many “bastards” there are (currently a closely guarded secret as the
Conservative right no longer makes the mistake of identifying itself via
clubs); on how many Lib Dems are prepared to break the whip and vote against
instead of abstaining (which Menzies Campbell has more than hinted at); and on the
attitude of the minor parties. Bear in mind that, unlike Labour, the minor
parties can be bought off. For example, the SNP would probably go for a deal
that maximises the number of Scottish MPs when the number of constituencies is
culled.
So trying to get reform through the Commons with a Lib Dem
abstention is an uncertain route, fraught with danger for Cameron. But one point
stands out. The first issue for Cameron is whether Clegg can be brought on
board. If he can, then Cameron can be confident of getting through the Commons
with a minimum of fuss. If he can’t, then things get much more difficult. Most
MPs still have to decide where they stand, creating enormous uncertainty, but
it’s certainly possible that Cameron could be defeated if he attempts to push
through reforms without Clegg’s support. So Cameron’s position has to be one of
wait-and-see until Clegg makes up his mind.
The shape of water
Today, Cameron clearly does have a wait-and-see approach.
His point man, David Willetts, is saying wait and see to questions. And the
formula that the coalition has agreed on for now - “looking at the feasibility
of changing the system of financing student tuition so that the repayment
mechanism is variable graduate contributions tied to earnings” - is a
wait-and-see formula [more on this below].
Meanwhile, Clegg is getting on with the task of maturing the
internal Lib Dem discussion to the point where he can decide whether he can
back a reform plan. Most Lib Dem MPs (and a lot of Labour ones, too) have
signed the NUS pledge, reading: “I pledge to vote against any increase in fees
in the next parliament and to pressure the government to introduce a fairer
alternative”.
To those like the Treasury and universities that want
students to pay more, this pledge is supposed to read like a “No Pasaran”
banner. Clegg’s task is to find a formula that allows Lib Dem MPs to vote with
the Conservatives in the Commons while saying they have not broken their
pledge. He can’t burn the banner or storm it; that would strengthen resistance. He
has to seep around the banner, taking on - in the phrase used by the novellist
Andrea Camilleri in describing the murky mafia-politics nexus in Italy - the
“shape of water”, which is to say, no solid position at all.
So between now and winter, the central action I think is
within the Lib Dems. As they face up to the realities of power and the detail
of the fees debate, how will opinion develop there? Just as Cameron has
alienated his right wing, Clegg has alienated his left. Where this
cold-shouldered rump of the party end up - people like Charles Kennedy, Simon
Hughes and Menzies Campbell - will be telling.
Parting of the ways
There will have to be ongoing discussions between Lib Dems
and Conservatives aimed at reaching an agreed coalition position, but both
sides can walk away without breaking faith or imperilling the coalition itself.
That makes a deal far from certain. From Cameron’s point of view, he probably
doesn’t need solid Lib Dem support. The key thing is to get support from Clegg.
A Lib Dem rebellion, even a sizeable one of 10-20 MPs, probably won’t matter
because the net inflow of Lib Dem votes will likely still be enough to stop the
bastards defeating the government.
One upshot of this arithmetic is that the political
environment for the development of policy in this area is highly, unusually,
unstable. To get the support of his party, Clegg needs to be able to sell any
reforms as “progressive”, ie left-wing. But if the Lib Dems drop out of the
equation, then Cameron needs the support of at least some bastards in the
Commons, and the more progressive the proposal is, the less they’ll like it.
Therefore, there is potentially a parting of the ways to
come. There are two ways for Cameron to be confident of getting a revised
system through the Commons. One is with the support of Nick Clegg, which will
have to be progressive. The other is without Clegg’s support, in which case the
safest route is anti-progressive with (probably unrelated) sweeteners for minor
parties, even though this risks a Lib Dem backlash. (The more right-wing the
proposal becomes, the more likely Lib Dem MPs are to break the whip and
actively vote against the proposal.)
This is the reverse of coalition politics as usual, which
consists of negotiating and narrowing differences. At the moment, Cameron can
wait and see. But once Browne reports, pressure will start to mount for him to
take a position. At this point he needs an answer from Clegg on whether he will
lead the Lib Dems in support of reforms, and what the price for that is. If
Cameron can’t get a clear answer to that question by the time Browne reports in
the autumn, then he is in a real quandary. Several points follow.
First, this is another reason for a wait-and-see policy.
Committing to either progressive or anti-progressive approaches would be to
give a hostage to fortune.
Second, this of itself becomes a powerful argument for Clegg
to win over wavering left-wing Lib Dems. Abstain and you gift victory to the
bastards, your bitterest opponents.
Third, the same sort of argument can also be used (with more
difficulty) by Cameron on the bastards. Hold out for anything too extreme and
I’ll do a progressive deal with the Lib Dems.
Fourth, it explains precisely the positions taken currently
by the coalition partners. Cameron is waiting for Clegg, and avoids taking a
position in the meantime. Clegg is aiming to bring the party on board to
support a vote in the commons, but can’t be sure of success. Hence he is
floating progressive ideas without committing to any of them.
Clegg’s gambit
Last month Cable floated the prospect of the Lib Dems voting
for reforms and the discussion within the party is now under way. Cable’s
speech was widely reported as a call to replace the current fees system with a
graduate tax. But here’s how I explained what’s going on in Research Fortnight:
Take a look at what Cable actually said in his big speech
on higher education: “I am interested in looking at the feasibility of changing
the system of financing student tuition so that the repayment mechanism is
variable graduate contributions tied to earnings”.
There is no mention of a graduate tax there. And, since
the speech to vice-chancellors at South Bank University, officials at Cable’s
Department of Business Innovation and Skills have been briefing universities
about the exact meaning of the word “variable”.
“Variable”, I am told, could mean that the amount paid by
the graduate varies according to their income (as in a graduate tax). But it
could also mean that it varies according to the university the student studied
at (as in truly variable fees), or indeed the subject they studied (as in
bye-bye government subsidy for humanities students).
Plus, of course, it can be argued that the existing fees
regime is tied to earnings since you don’t have to repay anything until your
salary reaches a set level.
Hence the meaning of the phrase “variable graduate
contribution tied to earnings” as defined by Cable is so broad as to allow for
any of the realistic options being considered by John Browne in his review of
student fees, including the minimalist option of tweaking the fees regime
without primary legislation.
Clearly Cable’s objective in spinning a “graduate tax”
(while in fact sticking to an agreed coalition “graduate contribution” line) is
to win Lib Dems over to the idea that the coalition’s proposals, when they
emerge, are progressive and therefore acceptable. Equally clearly, it is no
surprise when Willetts says he is only committed to a graduate contribution.
This also is what Cable has actually said.
The reaction to Cable’s speech shows this gambit has had
some success. The NUS greeted the speech with enthusiasm (even if
this has dulled a bit as the reality has sunk in). On the other hand, the
lecturers’ union has moved quickly to try and quash the idea that a graduate
tax would be progressive, arguing that teachers and nurses would still pay
more. This mixed reaction creates precisely the kind of confusion in the minds
of voters and Lib Dems that Clegg needs. What does Cable mean by a graduate
tax, and would it be progressive? The answer to these questions truly is as
shapeless as water itself.
End game
An important subtlety in all this is that very little
actually needs to go through Parliament. Nearly all the current financial
regime can be revised without legislation. Only the cap on tuition fees needs a
vote in the Commons, and that requires only a simple vote, not the lengthy
legislative consideration that would allow opponents to build momentum. Which
is not to say there won’t be some huge complicated bit of HE legislation as
part of all this. Just that that may turn out to be a distraction from the main
event.
I can see Cameron and Clegg playing right and left wings off
against each other all the way up to the division bell in an attempt to
navigate a middle way. As the detail of options emerges, as MPs properly
grapple with the issues, as soundings are taken and the whips squeeze, as deals
are lined up with minor parties and amidst a fog of brinksmanship and
disinformation, Cameron may find he is be able to muddle through with a
twin-track muddle.
But this would come at a price. It can only be done by
failing to take a meaningful position on the substantive questions, which will
be intellectually incoherent and - more’s the pity for Cameron as it’s one of
his strongest cards - by abdicating leadership for as long as the twin-track approach
persists.
This is why Cameron wants Clegg on side by the time Brown
reports, and why Lib Dems have to be softened up now for the U-turn on fees.